What motivated men to risk death in the most horrific war in U.S. history when pay was low and irregular and military punishment strategies were weak? In such an organization creating group loyalty by promoting social capital is of paramount importance and in the Civil War was the cement of both armies. We find that individual and company socio-economic and demographic characteristics, ideology, and morale were important predictors of group loyalty in the Union Army. Company characteristics were more important than ideology or morale. Soldiers in companies that were more homogeneous in ethnicity, occupation, and age were less likely to shirk.
Introduction
The Civil War was the most horrific war in United States history. The total number of deaths in the Civil War equaled the total number killed in almost all other wars combined and more than one out of every five white men participating died, over half of them from disease (Vinovskis 1990 ). The combatants faced death, the hardships and monotony of camp life, and distance from loved ones, all for low and irregular pay. One soldier wrote, "I have cursed the day I have enlisted for what benifit [sic] will I ever drive from being a Soldier. the common Soldier will not reap the Harvest of Victories but it is some other men that will gain all Praise Honor and Wealth." 1 Had he deserted, he would have faced only a 40 percent chance of being caught and a negligible risk of death if arrested (Linderman 1987: 174, 176) . A self-interested soldier would have deserted.
But, over 90 percent of all Union Army soldiers did not (Linderman 1987 ) and among Union
Army soldiers whose three year enlistment terms were up, half of them re-enlisted (McPherson 1997: 81-82) . What motivated these men to soldier on?
This paper investigates the individual and group socio-economic and demographic characteristics and the ideological characteristics that determined "quit rates," shirking, and high effort among Union Army soldiers. The measures of "cowardice" are desertion, arrests, and absences without leave. A measure of "heroism" is promotion from private to officer, though not deserting could also be regarded as heroism. Based upon his reading of soldiers' letters, McPherson (1997) argued that Civil War soldiers were sustained by convictions of duty, honor, patriotism, and ideology, impulses of courage and self-respect, and by fighting units' group cohesion and by peer pressure in their home communities. In reply to questionnaires, WWII enlisted soldiers cited ending the task, solidarity with the group, thoughts of home and loved ones, and a sense of duty and self-respect as the most important factors in movitating them to keep going (Stouffer et al. 1949: 109) . In contrast, Bearman (1991) argues that among men from North Carolina, local homogeneity led to high desertion rates. This paper provides the first largescale quantitative assessment of the correlates of cowardice and heroism based upon soldiers' deeds rather than their words. An unusually rich dataset provides us with detailed demographic and economic characteristics of individuals, of companies, and of the geographical areas from which individuals came. We find that individual and company socio-economic and demographic characteristics, ideology, and morale were important predictors of group loyalty in the Union Army.
Our analysis provides insights into firm organizational design. A distinguishing characteristic between the military and the modern firm is the military's inability (except for a mercenary army) to fully compensate individuals for risk and to link pay to performance. 2 In an organization where workers have discretion and unobserved effort matters, social capital is an important input into having a productive organization. 3 O'Reilly, Caldwell, and Barnett (1989) find that in work units where social integration is high, turnover is low. Social capital is also important for the economy as a whole. La Porta et al. (1997) show that worldwide trust is associated with more efficient judiciaries, less corruption, and higher quality government bureaucracies. Knack and Keefer (1997) find that trust predicts economic growth and Guiso et al. (2000) find that it predicts financial development.
Studying the Union Army has many advantages over previous studies of shirking and effort in organizations. One advantage is that the stakes are high. It is costly for a military company if an individual shirks. It is also costly for soldiers to do their duty, thus allowing researchers to obtain a better measure of commitment than firm turnover rates or questions on membership in organizations, the measures commonly used in the social capital and organizational behavior literature. Secondly, it is easier for team members to observe and for researchers to measure shirking in the military than in a modern firm. Thirdly, the way companies were organized provides us with an ideal set-up for study. Our data contain a large number of companies (303), but because each company consists of roughly 100 men, each is small enough so there can be relatively little Tiebout sorting within the company. Because companies were built on a local community basis, companies are heterogeneous whereas they would not be if there were random assignment. However, each company is large enough so that there cannot be perfect Tiebout sorting by groups of friends within companies. Finally, because the job of a soldier was unskilled, largely consisting of learning the movement of linear formations, of obeying orders without hesitation, and of mastering the 9 steps of loading a musket and firing in the direction of an enemy hidden by the smoke of the battlefield (Hess 1997: 18-19, 137) , worker skills are perfect substitutes.
Empirical Framework
All organizations face potential agency problems. Solutions for mitigating such problems include backloading pay, using promotions as an incentive, and paying bonuses to individuals (Lazear 1979 : Gibbons 1998 . But, Civil War soldiers who survived expected to be discharged from the war-time military when their enlistment term was up, were lucky if their pay arrived on time,
and faced a higher risk of death on the battlefield if promoted because officers led the charges.
Military outcomes are produced in a team setting, in which one or more regiments win or lose a battle. In such a case where only team output is observed and individual effort is not, a for profit can use pay for performance incentives to induce the efficient level of individual effort (Holmström 1982) . Unlike such an organization, the military substitutes loyalty for high powered incentives. 4 Assuming soldiers have a utility function over survival, honor, altruism and belief in the cause, they will place a greater weight on honor and on altruism if they feel closer to the men honoring them. 5 If men do not believe in the cause and do not care for the esteem of others, it is rational to shirk. Concern with personal honor depends in turn upon men's socioeconomic and demographic characteristics and on the characteristics of the organization. Because belief in the cause is less costly when one's side is winning, morale will also determine committment to a military organization. Our empirical framework can be thought of in terms of the following production functions:
social capital = g(individual characteristics community characteristics) : Empirical evidence examining individual interactions has found that the more similar are pairs of individuals, the higher is trust (Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, and Soutter 2000).
Another important factor in winning battles is the morale of the troops. Morale will depend upon support from the home front, leadership, and also upon the own unit's and the entire Army's success on the battlefield. The highly motivated men who served in the Spanish Civil War cited defeats, retreats, and heavy casualties, ignorance of objectives and lack of reliable news, and poor food, clothing, and shelter as the most common conditions in which demoralizing rumors were likely to spring up (Dollard 1943: 53 Our measures of cowardice and heroism are desertion, arrest, AWOL, and promotion to officer. Desertion is the best measure of shirking. Arrests and promotions depend upon officer decisions. Desertion is a more serious offense than AWOL and, because 10 percent of the sample deserted, it also is the measure with the largest number of outcomes. Absences without leave were generally failing to return from furlough on time and straggling from the company. Arrests that were not for desertions or AWOL were for drunkenness, assault, robbery, insubordination, and sleeping while on picket duty.
Our empirical strategy uses a time-varying competing risk hazard model to estimate days from entry into the company (muster-in) until desertion, arrest, AWOL, or promotion to officer. We use a competing risk framework because some men may have died, been discharged, changed company, become prisoners of war, or be missing in action before they could desert.
Similarly, some men may have died, been discharged, changed company, become prisoners of war, be missing in action, or have deserted before arrest, AWOL, or promotion to officer (see Figure 1 ). Hazard models provide a framework to estimate the micro and macro determinants of cowardice and heroism. Our estimated hazard, (t), is
where I indexes the individual variables, C indexes the company variables, G indexes the geographic variables, M indexes the morale variable for the Army as a whole and O (t) is the baseline hazard which we assume to be Weibull. The survival function thus takes the form, exp((; j t j ) p )
for subject j, where p is the duration dependence parameter and can be interpreted as representing whether men who were in the war longer became more or less committed soldiers. We present results both with and without the morale variable. The hazard ratios that we report indicate . Clustering on companies provides us with a lower bound on the standard error of company characteristics. 7 Our four basic types of independent variables are described in detail in the Appendix.
Our individual variables, I, consist of the year the individual was mustered in, country of birth, age, height in inches, whether the soldier was a volunteer, the soldier's marital status in 1860, the total personal property wealth in the soldier's 1860 household, and whether the soldier was illiterate. The year the soldier was mustered in and his volunteer status may reflect his ideological committment to the war. Men who enlisted after 1862 were commonly described as being without patriotism, honor, or interest in the cause (McPherson 1997: 9). Our company variables, C, consist of birthplace fragmentation, occupation fragmentation, the coefficient of variation for age, and the fraction of the company who died. The latter variable is a time-varying covariate estimated for each half year that the soldier was in the company and will reflect in part company specific morale. We do not treat the other company variables as time-varying covariates because there was very little change in company characteristics from the start to the end of their service.
Note that we cannot include company leader characteristics as a variable because we know leader characteristics only for internal promotions. Our geographic variables, G, are the percent of all 7 We estimate contextual interactions, wherein a soldier's behavior varies with such exogenous characteristics of the group as ethnic diversity. We also account for correlated effects at the company level arising from such factors as men's trust and opinion of the captain and lieutenants commanding the company and variation in punishments for desertion or AWOL by company. We do not attempt to identify endogenous interactions, wherein the soldier's behavior varies with the behavior of the group because while we observe individuals if they move out of a company, very few did and for those who did we cannot observe the characteristics of the company they move into. See Manski (2000) and (1993) for a discussion of endogenous interactions, contextual effects, and correlated effects.
votes in the soldier's county of enlistment for Lincoln (a measure of the soldier's own and the community's ideology) and population in the soldier's city of enlistment. Soldiers from large cities who shirked were more likely to be able to return to their hometowns without facing social sanctions from the entire town. Finally, our morale variable for the Army as a whole, M, is a time-varying measure. This measure is the fraction of major Union victories to all major battles for each half year that the soldier was in the service. Note that this variable does not vary across companies and only varies across individuals who were mustered in at different dates.
The Union Army
On the eve of the Civil War, the regular army consisted of only 15,000 enlisted men. 8 By the end of the war over 2 million men had served in the Union Army, with four out of five men born in the prime birth cohorts of 1837-1845 serving. From April 1861 to July 1862 the army depended solely upon volunteers enlisting for low pay. In July 1862, the Militia Act assigned quotas to each state to fill and these in turn assigned quotas to towns. When patriotic appeals failed, states and towns began offering men bounties to induce them to enlist so that they could fill their quotas. In March 1863 the Enrollment Act created a conscription system administered by the federal government. Quotas were assigned to each congressional district and then broken down into subdistricts within each district. When towns failed to meet their quotas, every able-bodied male citizen between the ages of 20 and 45 became eligible for the draft, though married men were less likely to be called. Draftees could hire a substitute to take their place or they could pay a commutation fee of $300 (equal to the yearly wage of an average worker) to be exempt from that particular draft, though not from another. Draftees and substitutes were relatively rare, constituting no more than 10 percent of all soldiers. Paying a commutation fee was also rare.
Only 87,000 men became exempt in this way.
States and individuals played a large role in the formation of regiments of volunteers, the basic units of the armies. The volunteer infantry regiments consisted of 10 companies, each containing roughtly 100 men, commanded by a captain and two lieutenants, often volunteer officers drawn from state militias, men of political significance, or assorted prominent men in the community. Professional officers were not necessarily more skilled in military matters because the West Point curriculum emphasized engineering rather than military tactics. Regiments were typically formed from men who came from the same area. Each company would generally contain bands of men who had known each other in civilian life. 9 Mitchell (1990) The Army's coercive powers were limited. As the war progressed, the Army designated units of provost guards to drive stragglers (men who milled at the rear) into line. However, because they were reluctant to shoot soldiers wearing the same uniform, they were not always effective. Similarly, executions for such serious penalties as desertion were relatively rare. Out of roughly 200,000 deserters, 80,000 were caught and returned to the army and 147 were executed for desertion (Linderman 1987: 174, 176 ). Executions were loathsome both to soldiers and to civilians. Instead the penalties for desertion, and also AWOL, generally ranged from fines and loss of pay to imprisonment (including with hard labor) to performance of the more onerous duties in the company to the social sanctions of men's home communities.
Data
Our data consist of 31,854 white, enlisted men in 303 Union Army infantry companies. 10 The sample represents roughly 1.3 percent of all whites mustered into the Union Army and 8 percent of all regiments that comprised the Union Army. The data are based upon a random sample of 331 companies drawn at the company level. Table 2 lists all variables used and shows that the sample means for those who deserted, were arrested, were AWOL, and were promoted to officer differ substantially from those for the entire sample. Among shirkers, the individual level variables that differ are year of muster, volunteer status, occupation, birth place, and household wealth. The company level variables that differ are birth place fragmentation, occupational fragmentation, coefficient of variation for age, and the fraction in the company dying. The geographic variables that differ are the fraction of votes cast for Lincoln, a measure of ideology, and population in city of enlistment. Shirking also occurs when Army-wide morale is low. Those promoted to officer were native-born professionals and proprietors who volunteered in 1861 and who were from high mortality companies.
Results
Our results show that, controlling for other variables, individual characteristics, company characteristics, geographic variables, and Army-wide morale were all important predictors of cowardice and heroism. However, the relative importance of these variables depends upon whether we examine desertions, arrests, AWOLs, or promotions to officer.
Consider first the case of desertion (see Table 3 ), arguably our best measure of shirking.
Men who enlisted in 1861, who volunteered, who were farmers, who were older, who came from a household with high property wealth in 1860, and who were literate were less likely to desert. 12 Relative to the native-born the Irish and British were more likely to desert. Married men were significantly more likely to desert, but the interaction term on married and personal property wealth was insignificant, suggesting that financial hardship at home did not necessarily lead to disproportionate desertions among married men. Whether a soldier was owed a bounty The symbols , y, and z indicate that the mean is significantly different from the mean for those not in the category at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. Arrests and AWOLs are those preceding desertion only. The logarithm of personal property wealth is set equal to zero for those for whom this information is missing. The standard deviations of log(total household personal property), birth place fragmentation, occupational fragmentation, the coefficient of variation for age, the percent in the company dying, and log(population) are 2. Days until desertion are measured from first mustering in. The symbols ,y, and z indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from 1 at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. Significance of all coefficients is for equality of all coefficients to 1. Men who died, became POWs, were discharged, were missing in action, or changed companies before first desertion are treated as censored. Covariates include dummy variables indicating missing information for occupation, the 1860 census, literacy, and county voting. Included region fixed effects are for Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, Border, and West (New England is the omitted category).
(as was true for many volunteers after 1862), decreased desertion rates, but the effect was not statistically significant. 13 Men who came from companies in which birth place, occupation, and age heterogeneity and mortality was high were all more likely desert. Although birth place fragmentation was not a statistically significant predictor of desertion when we clustered on companies, it became a statistically significant predictor when we dropped occupational fragmentation from the regression. When we included the company Gini coefficient for both personal and property wealth calculated from the 1860 census, we found that while men in companies where inequality was high were more likely to desert, the effect was statistically insignificant. Men who enlisted in large cities were more likely to desert (perhaps because they faced fewer community sanctions and because they were less likely to know the men in their company) and men from pro-Lincoln counties were less likely to desert. Finally, men were more likely to desert when the Union was losing.
The most important predictors of arrests were year of muster, ethnicity, and company heterogeneity (see Table 4 ). Men who volunteered in 1861 were less likely to be arrested. The
Irish and British were twice as likely to be arrested as the native-born. Men in companies in which birth place and occupational diversity was high were significantly more likely to be arrested.
The predictors of AWOL included year of muster, volunteer status, birth place fragmentation, and the company mortality rate, and the percent in county of enlistment voting for
Lincoln (see Table 5 ). Soldiers mustered in 1862 and 1863 were less likely to be AWOL than soldiers mustered in 1861. Married men were more likely to be AWOL (but not significantly so), probably because furloughs were generally granted only to married men thus providing them with the opportunity to go AWOL. The only company socioeconomic and demographic characteristic Days until arrest are measured from first mustering in. The symbols ,y, and z indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from 1 at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. The test for significance of all coefficients is for equality of all coefficients to 1. Men who died, became POWs, were discharged, were missing in action, changed companies, or deserted before first arrest are treated as censored. Covariates include dummy variables indicating missing information for occupation, the 1860 census, literacy, and county voting. Included region fixed effects are for Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, Border, and West (New England is the omitted category). Days until AWOL are measured from first mustering in. The symbols ,y, and z indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from 1 at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. Significance of all coefficients is for equality of all coefficients to 1. Men who died, became POWs, were discharged, were missing in action, changed companies, or deserted before first AWOL are treated as censored. Covariates include dummy variables indicating missing information for occupation, the 1860 census, literacy, and county voting. Included region fixed effects are for Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, Border, and West (New England is the omitted category).
that significantly predicted AWOL was birth place diversity. A high company mortality rate significantly reduced time until AWOL. Soldiers who enlisted in pro-Lincoln counties were less likely to be AWOL.
When we combined desertion, arrest, and AWOL as one outcome measure of "cowardice", we found that birth place and occupational fragmentation, age diversity, a high company death rate, a low fraction of Union victories, a small pro-Lincoln vote, enlisting in a large city, enlisting at a late date, and being a non-farmer, Irish or British rather than native-born, younger, poorer, and illiterate all led to higher cowardice rates.
The most important predictors of promotion from private to officer were year of muster, being a professional or proprietor or an artisan, ethnicity, height, and army-wide morale. Men mustered in 1861 were more likely to be promoted than men mustered in 1862-1864 and, rather surprisingly, men mustered in 1865 were more likely to be promoted than men mustered in 1861. Professionals or proprietors and artisans were more likely to be promoted than farmers or laborers. Men born abroad were less likely to be promoted than the native-born and the tall were more likely to be promoted. When morale was high, enlisted men may have been more likely to exert extra effort and therefore to be promoted. Note that although high birth place diversity is a positive, but insignificant predictor of promotion once we cluster on companies, it becomes a negative predictor of promotion, once we add dummies for Iowa and Wisconsin, the two states with unusually high promotion rates.
We find mixed evidence that soldiers became more committed to the cause the longer they remained in the army. Although desertion hazards decrease with time, arrest and AWOL hazards increase with time and promotion hazards decrease with time.
We experimented with state fixed effects for all regressions. One of the difficulties we faced is that when the number of companies within a state was small correlation between birth place and occupational fragmentation was high. In the case of promotion to officer, AWOL, and arrest, Days until promotion are measured from first mustering in. The symbols ,y, and z indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from 1 at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. The significance of all coefficients is for equality of all coefficients to 1. Men who died, became POWs, were discharged, were missing in action, changed companies, or deserted before first promotion to officer are treated as censored. Covariates include dummy variables indicating missing information for occupation, the 1860 census, literacy, and county voting. Included region fixed effects are for Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, Border, and West (New England is the omitted category).
the coefficients on company socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, the company death rate, and the percentage of the county voting for Lincoln remained unchanged. For desertion, both birth place and occupational fragmentation were statistically significant predictors of desertion, but the proportion of the county voting for Lincoln (a measure that varies more across states than within states) became an insignificant predictor.
We investigated what predicted re-enlistment for another 3 year term among men who enlisted in 1861 and who had already served a 3 year term. Approximately half of re-enlistees in the sample received a bounty upon re-enlistment. Generally men re-enlisted as regiments or companies (Hess 1997: 89) . Older men, men from large cities, and Germans were less likely to re-enlist and men who received a bounty for re-enlisting were more likely to re-enlist, but these were the only characteristics that predicted re-enlistment.
14 Throughout the paper we have assumed that social capital is a productive input. There could be a "dark side" of social capital such that geater homogeneity contributes to shirking and to favoritism. We did not find that company characteristics predicted battlefield mortality among men, suggesting that more homogeneous companies were not successful in colluding to straggle away from the front lines. We investigated whether there was any interaction between own ethnicity and that of a company officer for the limited set of companies for which we know something about the officers because they rose from the ranks. In the case of AWOL, the Irish were significantly more likely to be AWOL if the company had an Irish officer, but we could not determine if punishments for AWOL were lower in these companies. However, both the Irish and the British were more likely to be arrested if the company contained an Irish or British officer and the British were significantly less likely to desert if the contained a British officer. We also 14 There was no dishonor in not re-enlisting. Newton Scott, a private in the 36th Iowa Infantry, Company A, wrote to Hannah Cone, "I think it the Duty of Every Able Bodied man If Necessary to Help Defend His country But I think 3 years Sufficient long for one man to Serve while they all take there [sic] turns..." http://www.civilwarletters.com investigated whether the interactions between own occupation and the proportion of men in the company in that occupation and own birth place and the proportion of men of that ethnicity were at all significant. The Irish were less likely to be arrested if the proportion of Irish in the company was high. Soldiers were more likely to desert if the at least 50 percent of the company was Irish, but the Irish were significantly less likely to desert if at least 50 percent of the company was Irish.
Artisans were less likely to desert or to be arrested if the proportion of artisans in the company was high. However, laborers were more likely to desert and to be arrested if the proportion of laborers in the company was high.
We have a unique opportunity to study peer groups for brothers, fathers, and sons among men linked to the 1860 census. These men might either be more likely to shirk because collusion is easier or be less likely to shirk because of loyalty. We find that having close kin in the same company increased the probability of desertion, but the coefficient was not statistically significant.
It decreased significantly decreased the odds of going AWOL and did not affect arrests.
As previously noted, we have not attempted to identify endogeneous interactions. However, because of the non-linearity of our estimation equation, the endogeneous interaction can be estimated off of the functional form (Manksi 1993, 2000; Brock and Durlauf 2001). We therefore included a time-varying measure of the fraction in the company deserting in our desertion specification as a robustness check. We found that this measure significantly increased desertion rates, but that the company death rate became an insignificant predictor of desertion and that the significance of the coefficient on the proportion of Union victories fell from 1 to 10 percent. All other coefficients were unaffected. Desertion, AWOL, and arrest probabilities are predicted from the third specifications in Tables 3, 4 , and 5, respectively. Promotion to officer is predicted from the fourth specification in Table 6 . In this sample, the largest share of the vote Lincoln received in a county was 86.6%.
Implications for Organizational Design
What do our results imply about designing a well functioning military organization? Table 7 shows the relative importance of company socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, morale, and ideology for the predicted probability of desertion, arrest, AWOL, and promotion to officer. (This   table also provides a good indication of the magnitude of the coefficients on our variables.) Here we treat the company death rate as morale variable specific to the company and volunteer status, the percent of the county voting for Lincoln, and whether the recruit was mustered in in 1861
as ideology variables. In the case of desertion the single most important variables were age and occupational diversity within the company. In the case of arrests, birth place and occupational fragmentation, the fraction of Union victories, the percentage of the county voting for Lincoln, and year of muster were the single most important predictors. Birth place diversity, age diversity and the fraction of the county voting for Lincoln were the most important predictors of AWOL.
The single most important predictors of promotion to officer were age diversity and the fraction of Union victories. On the whole company socioeconomic and demographic characteristics were the most important predictors of desertion, arrest, AWOL, and promotion to officer. Morale was relatively more important than ideology for promotion to officer and ideology was relatively more important than morale for desertion, arrest, and AWOL.
Why does the Army today not make greater use of social capital by creating socioeconomic and demographically homogeneous fighting units? Two reasons include diversification and human capital specialization in the modern army. Drawing companies on the local level ended after highly-publicized losses to communities during World War II. In the modern army, soldiers perform a myriad of tasks requiring different training. Because their skills are not perfect substitutes, the modern army is more likely to face a bundling problem which inhibits it from achieving the high level of social capital that the "old" army could achieve.
Conclusion
What motivates loyalty to an organization? Is it the attributes of a person, the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the organization, the attributes of the organization's leader, belief in the organization's mission, or self-interest? Recent studies have argued that sacrifice among Ultra-Orthodox Jews provides them with self-insurance benefits (Berman 2000) and that loyalty to street gangs can provide future riches (Levitt and Venkatesh 2000) . Iannaccone (1992) argues that efficient religions may benefit from self-sacrifice because of free rider problems. In contrast, loyal Union Army soldiers gained little monetary compensation, only the knowledge that they could hold their heads high among their comrades and in their home towns (McPherson 1997: 77-84). In such an organization creating group loyalty is of paramount importance. Group loyalty in the Civil War was the "cement of the armies," allowing both the Union and the Confederacy to mount comprehensive military efforts even though indiscipline was chronic, military training scant, and the system of military justice weak (Linderman 1987: 35-36) .
How was this group loyalty created? Individual socio-economic and demographic characteristics, company socio-economic and demographic characteristics, ideological committment, and morale were all important determinants of group loyalty among Union Army soldiers in the Civil War. Company socio-economic and demographic characteristics were particulary important, even more so than ideological committment and morale. However, while homogeneous companies were more successful in accomplishing the short-run goal of fielding full companies, we cannot ascertain whether there were any long-run benefits of being in a heterogenous company to individual soldiers.
Data Appendix
This appendix describes the construction of our individual level variables, our company level variables, our geographic level variables, and our morale variable for the Army as a whole. 
Individual Level Variables
1. Dependent variable. We calculated days from muster until desertion, arrest, AWOL, or promotion to officer. We allowed for censoring by also calculating days from muster until death, discharge, changing company, becoming prisoner of war, or missing in action.
1. Fraction of major Union victories. This is a time-varying variable that indicates for each half year that the recruit was in the service the fraction of major Union victories to all major battles in that half-year. It takes the value 0 if there were no major battles.
